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COMMENTS
DAMAGES-PROXIMATE CAUSE--LIABILITY OF GAS COMPANY FOR
ILLNESS CAUSED BY NEGLIGENTLY SHUTTING OFF THE GAS
The defendant, a supplier of natural gas to the public, was
sued in tort for physical suffering and loss of income allegedly
caused by its negligently cutting off the service to the plaintiff,
who heated her home with this fuel. The defendant mistakenly
thought that the plaintiff's bill was unpaid. The plaintiff estab-
lished that the pneumonia which she contracted was occasioned
by her repeatedly going out into a blizzard to call the defendant
and by her exposure in the cold house. The trial court submitted
the question whether the gas company's negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries to the jury, and it
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $350. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma unanimously sustained the action
of the trial court.1
Although the relationship between a consumer and a public
utility, such as the defendant gas company, is normally created
by contract, an action in tort will nevertheless frequently lie.
"It is often the case that the same wrong is both a breach of
contract and a tort.' ' 2 The duties inherent in the nature of a
public calling exist apart from those created by a contract with
the consumer. The contract merely creates the relationship to
which these inherent duties attach. For example, when a gas
company was held liable in tort for failing to notify the plaintiff
that his service would be temporarily halted while the gas
lines were repaired, it was said:
From the nature of the business, and out of the relation thus
established between the parties, the law independently of
the contract, implied certain duties on the part of the
company. A breach of its duty by turning off the gas supply
in cold weather.., was a distinct wrong, and the right to
recover compensation for the tortious injury was neither
dependent upon the existence of a specific contract nor sub-ject to be defeated by proof that there was a contractual
relation between the parties3
1. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Gray, 204 Okla. 362, 230 P.2d 256(1951).
2. PRossER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 202 (1941). Accord: Coy
v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897); Warfield Natural
Gas Co v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21 (1934); Hoeble v.
Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. 21 (1897).
3. Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. 21, 25 (1897). See
also the statement in Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257
Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21 (1934).
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The action's being in tort rather than contract is important
for several reasons. The most important difference is in the
measure of damages. A breach of contract gives rise to damages
redressing only those losses which were reasonably foreseeable
at the time the contract was entered into. In practice this means
that a contractual recovery is limited to the "natural and prob-
able consequences" of a breach, unless it is shown that the
parties contemplated more extensive liability.4 In contrast,
liability in tort extends to all losses proximately caused by the
defendant's breach of duty. The precise extent of tort liability
is incapable of definition, but it will, in general, encompass much
more than would be included in a recovery in contract.
In addition, the contributory negligence of a plaintiff might
be a bar to recovery in tort, whereas there is no such doctrine
in the field of contract.5 Also, in order to proceed in contract,
the plaintiff must be in privity with the defendant or perhaps
qualify under a third party beneficiary rule adopted in the juris-
diction, whereas this technical requirement need not be satisfied
when one sues in tort.
Many courts are ordinarily reluctant to allow a tort recovery
when the defendant has been guilty of no more than a non-
feasance.6 Nevertheless, the few courts passing upon the point
have held that a gas company will be liable in tort for a negli-
gent delay in commencing service. 7 This view has the sanction
of Professor Prosser, who says:
... if a relation exists which would give rise to a legal duty
without enforcing the contract promise itself, the tort action
will lie, otherwise not.8
The necessary relationship exists in this class of cases because
the gas company in accepting its franchise as a public utility
assumes to supply all who request its services, after complying
with reasonable regulations.
All the cases agree that once the utility has begun performing
4. Coy v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897);
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGEs § 318 (1935).
5. In a contract action, the requirement of minimizing damages will
sometimes operate to reduce damages and might, in some instances, prevent
any recovery, but this is founded upon a completelr different theory.
6. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 205 (1941)
7. Ft. Smith Gas Co. v. Cloud, 75 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1935); Coy v.
Indianapolis Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897).
8. Op. cit. supra note 2, at 205. Accord: Coy v. Indianapolis Gas Co.,
146 Ind. 655, 661, 46 N.E. 17, 19 (1897).
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it is guilty of a tort if it cuts off the consumer's supply without
sufficient cause.9 However, it may discontinue its service when
there are unpaid bills, or if the customer has failed to comply
with reasonable regulations.-° When there is an honest dispute
between the parties about the amount of the bill, however, the
company cannot arbitrarily shut off the supply." Nor can it, as
a general rule, refuse its service because of a collateral matter,
i.e., one not related to the service.12
The principal case, then, falls within a category in which the
defendant's duty and breach are clear. (The defendant admitted
that there was no justification for cutting off the gas.) Also,
the cause-in-fact relationship of the negligence to the injury
presented no serious problem. 3 A slightly more difficult issue
was that of proximate cause. In general, the courts say that
the negligent gas company will be liable for all injuries proxi-
mately caused. 4
Under the guise of proximate cause are subsumed those policy
9. Birmingham Gas Co. v. McKinley, 228 Ala. 596, 154 So. 289 (1934);
Carson v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 108 Ark. 452, 158 S.W. 129(1913); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79
S.W.2d 21 (1934); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 188 Okla. 521,
111 P.2d 173 (1941); Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. 21(1897); Wink Gas Co. v. Huskey, 42 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
10. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Young, 116 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1940);
Detroit Gas Co. v. Moreton Truck & Storage Co., 111 Mich. 401, 69 N.W.
659 (1897).
11. Birmingham Gas Co. v. McKinley, 228 Ala. 596, 154 So. 289 (1934).
Also inferentially in point are cases in which the courts have not allowed
water and electric companies to cut off the service where there is an honest
dispute about the amount of the bill. Sims v. Alabama Water Co., 205 Ala.
378, 87 So. 688 (1920); Schultz v. Lakeport, 5 Cal.2d 377, 54 P.2d 1110,
modified 5 Cal.2d 377, 55 P.2d 485 (1936); Steele v. Clinton Electric Light
& Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 193 Atl. 613 (1937) ; Dodd v. Atlanta, 154 Ga.
33, 113 S.E. 166 (1922).
12. Seaton Mountain Electric Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Idaho
Springs Inv. Co., 149 Colo. 122, 111 Pac. 834 (1910); Snell v. Clinton
Electric, Light, Heat & Power Co., 196 Ill. 626, 63 N.E. 1082 (1902);
Vanderberg v. Kansas City Missouri Gas Co., 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S.W.
17 (1907); State ex rel. Deeney v. Butte Electric & Power Co., 43 Mont.
118, 115 Pac. 44 (1911); Miller v. Roswell Gas & Electric Co., 22 N.M.
594, 166 Pac. 1177 (1917); People ex rel. New York Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 157 App. Div. 156, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1018 (3d Dep't
1913) ; Miller v. Wilkes-Barre Co., 206 Pa. 254, 55 Atl. 974 (1903) ; Allen v.
Park Place Water Light & Power Co., 266 S.W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
13. Cause in fact, as defined by Prosser, means that the defendant's
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's injury, or that
plaintiff's injury would not have occured "but for" defendant's negligent
conduct. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 342 (1941).
14. Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d
21 (1934); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 188 Okla. 521, 111 P.2d
173 (1941).
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factors which must limit the defendant's liability someplace
short of all the consequences of his act. It is unanimously agreed
that the defendant will be held for all foreseeable consequences
of his conduct.' 5 And most of the decisions in a situation like
that of the principal case have held that illness of the plaintiff
as a result of exposure to the cold is a foreseeable consequence.,,
To be foreseeable:
the consequences must be a normal, substantial part of
the risk, which a reasonable man would recognize as fairly
to be taken into account by the defendant at the time of
the act.1
7
It is difficult to quarrel with the findings of most courts that the
contracting of influenza or pneumonia meets this test.
Moreover, even though such injuries as those suffered by the
plaintiff in the principal case be found not reasonably foresee-
able, they would probably create a liability in the defendant
under the majority American view. Under this view, despite
the unforeseeable nature of the injuries, if they were directly
caused by the defendant's act without the aid of intervening
forces, he is liable.18 A statement from Coy v. Indianapolis Gas
Co., sets forth this point of view:
All damages directly traceable to the wrong done and aris-
ing without any intervening agency and without fault of the
injured person himself are recoverable. The wrong in such
case is said to be the proximate cause of the injury.'
Again, just as most of the courts have found the bodily illnesses
of the plaintiff to have been foreseeable, most of the decisions
have said that those injuries were directly caused by the de-
fendant's shutting off the gas supply.20 In finding that the
injuries were directly caused, the courts are saying either that
there was in fact no intervening force21 or that, if there was any
intervening agency, it was a foreseeable or normal one which
15. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 342 (1941).
16. Coy v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897);
Warield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21(1934); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 188 Okla. 521, 111 P.2d
173 (1941); Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. 21 (1897).
17. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 343 (1941).
18. Id. at 340, 343.
19. 146 Ind. 655, 663, 46 N.E. 17, 20 (1897).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Intervening forces " . . should be understood in a very general
sense of concurring causes of either natural or human origin, which comes
into active operation at a later time to change a situation resulting from
the defendant's conduct." PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 354.
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does not absolve the defendant from liability. The plaintiff's
remaining in the house, if it is an intervening agency at all, is
certainly to be anticipated by the defendant. And, although the
plaintiff's venturing outside to call the company is properly
designated an intervening force, it too is a foreseeable and
normal event. The courts ordinarily do not indulge in an analysis
as detailed as this. Rather, if the new and independant cause is
not of such an unusual nature that it will operate to relieve the
defendant of liability, the courts summarize this conclusion by
saying the injury was "directly caused."22
Thus a decided majority of the jurisdictions would concur in
the holding of the court in the instant case that the negligence
of the gas company was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. They would find either foreseeability or direct causa-
tion or both.
One further obstacle might remain in the way of the plaintiff's
recovery, however. This is the problem of contributory negli-
gence. Although only a few of the courts have talked in terms
of contributory negligence, this seems to have been what some
of them had in mind when discussing intervening causes. That
inference is particularly reasonable because when the subsequent
activities of the plaintiff are dealt with as intervening forces,
their quite normal and foreseeable nature should make any
substantial discussion of the proximate cause problem unneces-
sary. On the other hand, since they are activities of the plain-
tiff, even though they be labeled foreseeable, if they be found
unreasonable, they will nevertheless absolve the defendant of
liability. However, in most cases where the consumer has con-
ducted himself in much the same way as the plaintiff in the
case under discussion, the courts have found no contributory
negligence.L> For example, in an almost identical case, Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 24 it was held that the plaintiff acted
with reasonable prudence in leaving her house to report the
22. If the defendant's tort be deemed one of continuous duration until
the service is restored, then the activities of the plaintiff in the interim
would be a concurrent, rather than supervening, force. This analysis has
not been perceived in the cases, however.
23. Coy v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897);
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21
(1934); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 188 Okla. 521, 111 P.2d
173 (1941).
24. 188 Okla. 521, 111 P.2d 173 (1941).
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fact that her gas had been disconnected and in then r6turning
to her unheated house.
However, in one instance, after finding the defendant not
negligent, the court by a dictum indicated that it considered
the consumer's remaining in an unheated house to be contribu-
tory negligence because he could have found shelter with the
rest of his family in a neighboring house.2 5
Although some examples of carelessness might be hypothe-
sized,2 6 the plaintiff's ordinary course of conduct in remaining
in his own home and perhaps venturing outside only to com-
municate with the defendant is almost invariably held not
contributory negligence. That result seems quite correct, for
there is little else that the plaintiff can do.
In conclusion, it is not surprising that the court should find
the gas company liable for illness caused by its negligently cut-
ting off the gas. Conventional analysis in negligence cases yields
this result. There are also several policy factors which probably
influence the court to allow recovery. The monopolistic position
of the public utility, which places the consumer at the mercy
of the gas company, is probably a factor. Public utilities tradi-
tionally owe a high standard of care to the public, and permitting
recovery in a situation of this kind motivates the company to
adhere to this standard as nearly as possible.27
RONALD L. CUPPLES
25. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Cloud, 75 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1935). The
value of the case on this point is very limited. In the first place, it was
a mere dictum; secondly, it was a non-feasance case; and thirdly, the
plaintiff and his family were just moving into the house so that there
was no particular reason for plaintiff to remain there.
26. For example, taking a bath in the unheated house.
27. This consideration undoubtedly explains the liberality with which
interests less substantial than bodily integrity are sometimes protected.
In one instance, an award of $500 for embarassment at not being able to
cook for dinner guests was upheld. Glover v. Southern Cities Distributing
Co., 142 So. 289 (La. App. 1932). And in Birmingham Gas Co. v. McKinley,
228 Ala. 596, 154 So. 289 (1934), damages were allowed for the annoyance
and inconvenience arising out of plaintiff's being unable to cook and
heat water for her family. Contra: Detroit Gas Co. v. Moreton Truck &
Storage Co., 111 Mich. 401, 69 N.W. 659 (1897); Wink Gas Co. v. Huskey,
42 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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